Abstract-Using industry-level data disaggregated by states, this paper finds a positive impact of trade liberalization on (the absolute values of) labor demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector. The magnitudes of these elasticities turn out to be negatively related to protection levels that vary across industries and over time. Furthermore, we find that these elasticities are not only larger in size for Indian states with more flexible labor regulations, they are also impacted there to a larger degree by trade reforms. Finally, we find that the reforms have led to a reduction in the share of labor in total output and value added, possibly due to the reduction in the bargaining power of workers.
I. Introduction
T RADE reforms, even though considered to be welfare enhancing in the aggregate, do not have a uniform impact on all sections of society. Most trade economists like to think about the impact of these reforms in terms of their consequences for capitalists and workers. For example, in the presence of intersectoral factor mobility, opening up an economy to international trade in goods will help labor and hurt capital or vice versa, depending on whether the country's comparative advantage is in labor-or capital-intensive products. In fact, there is an important, ongoing debate on whether trade hurts or benefits unskilled labor relative to skilled workers (the owners of human capital), to which already many well-known scholars in the area have contributed. 1 A new aspect of the trade-labor linkage that has received some attention in recent years is the impact of international trade in goods on the own price elasticity of labor demand. The importance of this element of the labor market impact of trade was first emphasized by Rodrik (1997) . He argues that trade makes the demand for labor more elastic which in turn leads to larger employment and wage shocks as a result of given vertical shifts in the labor demand curve (arising from shocks to productivity or to output demand). Also, this increase in the absolute value of elasticity leads to the erosion of the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of supernormal profits. And finally, it also results in labor bearing a larger burden of the impact of nonwage labor costs. Thus, through this channel, workers are placed under greater pressure as a result of trade liberalization (see Slaughter, 1997 , for a detailed discussion of these effects). 2 Why does an increase in openness lead to an increase in (the absolute value of) labor demand elasticity? 3 There are two main channels that Rodrik (1997) points out. Firstly, trade reforms allow cheaper imports of intermediate and capital inputs as well as of semifinished goods and unassembled parts for assembly/finishing in the importing country. All these imports are substitutes for the services of domestic labor. Thus substitution possibilities in production increase with the availability of possibly cheaper and a larger variety of inputs.
The second channel works through one of HicksMarshallian laws of factor demand which can be stated as follows: "The demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce" (see Hicks, 1963, and Slaughter, 2001) . Unlike the first channel, which works through what, is often called the "substitution effect," the second channel works through the "scale effect" (see Hamermesh, 1993) . It is the derived nature of input demand that drives this effect. More specifically, in the presence of a higher output demand elasticity, a given percentage change in output price, resulting from a change in the wage, will lead to a larger percentage change in the output demand (and thus in the scale of production), which in turn calls for a greater percentage change in employment. Given that trade liberalization leads to the greater availability of substitutes for any product (and thus to greater substitution possibilities in consumption), product demand elasticity increases, 4 which in turn, as explained above, raises factor demand elasticities.
The first paper that provides a systematic and rigorous empirical investigation of the impact of the hypothesized positive effect of trade on labor demand elasticities is Slaughter (2001) . Using four-digit industry-level data for the United States for the period 1961-1991, he finds mixed support for the hypothesis. While own price elasticities of the demand for production workers have kept increasing over time, Slaughter finds no such trend for nonproduction workers. Another paper, by Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy (2001) , uses plant-level data from Turkey to examine the same hypothesis and finds no empirical support for it. 5 In this paper, using industry-level data disaggregated by fifteen major states, we empirically examine the impact of the Indian trade reforms, initiated in 1991, on labor demand elasticities in the manufacturing sector. The time period spanned by our data set is 1980-1997, and so we test whether these elasticities were higher in the postreform period, 1992-1997 as compared to the previous period, 1980-1991. We also examine whether these elasticities are related to protection measures that vary over time from 1988-1997 and across industries. As our data are by industry and by state, we investigate whether these elasticities and the changes in them, as a consequence of trade liberalization, vary across states. In particular, India's states differ in terms of the restrictions they place on the firing and hiring of workers. By distinguishing between states with "rigid" and "flexible" labor markets on the basis of such restrictions, we are able to examine the relationships between labor demand elasticities, trade liberalization, and labor market rigidity.
Across all the specification we run, there are three robust findings. First, labor demand elasticities go up after the trade reforms. Second, we find that the higher the protection an industry receives, the lower is its labor demand elasticity. This empirical regularity seems to hold over time and across industries. And third, states with more flexible labor markets (that is, states in which there are fewer restrictions on the hiring and firing of labor) not only have a more elastic demand for labor, the impact of trade reforms on their labor demand elasticity is also greater.
We also look at the effect of trade liberalization on labor's share in output and value added. We find that this share declined with reforms and is an increasing function of tariffs. This is consistent with Rodrik's (1997) hypothesis that trade reforms adversely affect the bargaining power of workers through their impact on labor demand elasticities.
Thus, we believe that the contribution of the paper is threefold. It tests the hypothesized link between trade and labor demand elasticity for a very large, developing country. This largeness also has the feature of diverse labor institutions and regulations across states. By exploiting this diversity, we are able to examine whether the effects of trade reforms on labor demand elasticities are contingent on the nature of labor market regulations, making this the first paper that separates the effects of trade reforms and labor regulations and at the same time looks at the interaction between the two. This paper also provides a test of the hypothesized impact of trade liberalization on labor's share in output and value added (its bargaining power relative to other factors of production).
II. Indian Policy Framework

A. The Trade Reforms in India
In the 1980s, India experienced moderate economic growth. However, this growth was accompanied by large macroeconomic imbalances reflected in the rapid rise in the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, in foreign commercial debt, and in the debt service ratio (all these being consequences mainly of fiscal indiscipline). These problems were further accentuated by the Gulf War that drastically raised the price of oil. At this time, the general elections of 1991 brought to power a new government that inherited probably the world's most complex and restrictive trade regime based on a firm belief in export pessimism and in the effectiveness of import substitution. Upon assuming power, this new government approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help in solving its external payments problem, which by then had assumed crisis-like proportions. The IMF loans came attached with the strong conditionality of major economic reforms, which were initiated almost immediately. Given several earlier attempts to avoid IMF loans and the associated conditionalities, the large number of members of the new cabinet who had been cabinet members in past governments with inward-looking trade policies, and the heavy reliance on tariffs as a source of revenues, these reforms came as a surprise.
The major trade reform objectives announced by the Indian government in July 1991 included the removal of most licensing and other nontariff barriers on all imports of intermediate and capital goods, the broadening and simplification of export incentives, the removal of export restrictions, the elimination of the trade monopolies of the state trading agencies, the simplification of the trade regime, the reduction of tariff levels and their dispersion, and the full convertibility of the domestic currency for foreign exchange transactions. Subsequently, the maximum tariff was reduced from 400% to 150% in July 1991 , to 110% in February 1992 , to 85% in February 1993 , 64% in February 1994 , and to roughly 45% by 1997 . The mean tariff went from 128% before July 1991 to 94% in February 1992 , 71% by February 1993 , 55% in February 1994 , and to roughly 35% by 1997 . The standard deviation of tariffs during this period went down from 41 percentage points to roughly 15. 6 As far as the nontariff barriers were concerned, prior to 1991, there were quantitative restrictions on 90% of the value added in the manufacturing sector. In April 1992, all 5 Maskus and Bohara (1985) use data for one year to see the relationship between labor demand elasticities and product demand conditions in U.S. manufacturing.
6 See Dutt (2003) and Krishna and Mitra (1998) .
the 26 import licensing lists were eliminated. However, a "negative list" (from which most intermediate and capital goods were excluded) of items, whose imports were prohibited, was introduced, thereby eliminating many of the licensing procedures and discretionary decisions of the previous import regime. Table 1 provides tariff rates and nontariff barrier (NTB) coverage rates for 1988 and 1997 for different industries in the Indian manufacturing sector. Level and percentage changes in tariffs and NTBs between 1988 and 1997 are also shown and indicate substantial reductions in tariffs and NTBs. The reductions were fairly steady after 1991 but much deeper in some industries than in others.
There were also changes in the exchange rate. The Indian rupee was devalued 20% against the U.S. dollar in July 1991 and further devalued in February 1992 when an explicit dual exchange market was introduced. The percentage reduction in tariffs and nontariff barriers were much greater than the percentage devaluation (and even larger relative to the real-exchange-rate devaluation on account of fairly high inflation, hitting roughly 14%, during the initial years of the reforms). Therefore, the import-enhancing effect of the trade reforms should have more than offset the import-reducing effect of the exchange rate devaluation.
B. Labor Markets: Regulations and Rigidity
While a comprehensive review of India's labor markets is beyond the scope of this paper, two key features of labor regulations in India and their implications for labor market rigidity in the manufacturing sector are worth noting. 7 First, legislative authority over labor issues falls with both the central (federal) government as well as individual state governments so that the latter have the authority to amend central legislations or to introduce subsidiary legislations. In addition, the enforcement of many labor regulations, even those enacted by the central government, lies with the state governments. Both factors suggest that there may be considerable variation in labor regulations and/or their enforcement across India's states.
Second, a number of proreform policymakers and analysts believe that India's labor laws have made labor markets in the manufacturing sector rigid in the sense of placing serious impediments in the hiring and firing of workers. As per the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), the key piece of legislation that lies at the heart of the debate on labor laws and rigidity in India, it is necessary for firms employing more than 100 workers to obtain the permission of state governments in order to retrench or lay off workers. 8, 9 While the IDA does not prohibit retrenchments, critics of the act argue that it is difficult to carry them out. Datta Chaudhuri (1996) argues, for example, that states have often 7 See Dutt (2003) and Anant (2000) for more detailed discussions of India's labor market regulations. 8 Until 1976, the provisions of the IDA were fairly uncontroversial. The IDA allowed firms to lay off or retrench workers as per economic circumstances as long as certain requirements such as the provision of sufficient notice, severance payments, and the order of retrenchment among workers (last in, first out) were met. An amendment in 1976 (the introduction of Chapter VB), however, made it compulsory for employers with more than 300 workers to seek the prior approval of the appropriate government before workers could be dismissed. A further amendment in 1982 widened the scope of this regulation by making it applicable to employers with 100 workers or more. 9 The term layoff refers to a temporary or seasonal dismissal of a group of workers due to slackness of current demand. Retrenchments, on the other hand, denote permanent dismissals of groups of workers. Both terms may be distinguished from "termination," which refers to separation of an individual from his or her job. 
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been unwilling to grant permission to retrench, perhaps for reasons of political expediency.
It is important to note, however, that not all analysts agree that India's labor laws have made for a rigid labor market. In particular, an important counterargument to the views expressed above is that India's labor regulations relating to job security have been either ignored (see, Nagaraj, 2002) or circumvented through the increased usage of temporary or contract labor (see, in particular, Dutta, 2003, and Ramaswamy, 2003) . 10 Ultimately, whether India's labor laws have created significant rigidities in labor markets is an empirical issue.
III. Theory
A. The Labor Demand Function
As shown in Hamermesh (1993) , the cost minimization problem of the firm yields the following constant-output labor demand function and elasticity, respectively:
where r, w, and m are the user cost of capital, the wage rate, and the materials price respectively, while L, Q, , and S L stand for labor, quantity of output, the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to other inputs, and the share of labor in overall output, respectively. The elasticity here represents purely the substitution effect. 11, 12 Thus, the wage elasticity of the constant-output labor demand is increasing in the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to other inputs and decreasing with respect to labor's output share. Trade liberalization facilitates the import of larger varieties of inputs and, therefore, increases the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to all other inputs. In other words, new imported material and capital inputs can substitute for the services of domestic workers. Moreover, if we consider the overall production function of a firm as an aggregation of production functions for different stages of production, then trade liberalization, by facilitating imports of semifinished and unassembled products (to be finished and assembled in the home country) will reduce the share of domestic labor in the overall sales of the industry. With other (imported) inputs available after trade liberalization, the share of labor in overall output may go down. When certain stages of domestic production can be replaced with the purchase of foreign inputs, it is quite possible that after trade liberalization the elasticity, ␤, of output with respect to domestic labor may fall in the overall production function for final output. Therefore, this logic generalizes to the case of imperfect competition as well.
Another issue we focus on in this paper is the effect of labor regulations. As noted in section IIB, India's labor laws are widely believed to have led to restrictions on the hiring and firing of workers, thereby limiting or putting constraints on substitution possibilities in response to changes in factor prices and effectively reducing the elasticity of substitution .
From cost minimization, we now move on to the problem of profit maximization by a competitive firm. The industrylevel output is endogenously determined for given demand conditions for output. 13 The following formula from Hamermesh (1993) for the unconditional labor demand elasticity (at the level of the industry) with respect to the nominal wage provides us with some useful intuition:
where ε D is own price elasticity of product demand. Equation (2) tells us that the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the nominal wage is a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of product demand, the weights respectively being the share of factors other than labor and that of labor in output. The first term, (1 Ϫ s L ), represents the substitution effect coming from the fact that as the wage goes up, firms substitute other inputs for labor. The second term, S L ε D , is the scale effect, which is that an increase in wage, by increasing the cost of production and the equilibrium price, reduces the scale of production and hence also reduces quantity of labor demanded. As explained before, the elasticity of substitution goes up due to trade liberalization. Also, the increased availability of substitutes for the final good will make the output demand more elastic. Thus for a fixed share of labor in output, liberalization will move the labor demand elasticity in the upward direction. However, as explained in the case of the constant-output labor demand elasticity, the share of labor in total output may also go down, which may introduce some ambiguity and thus make empirical work in this area all the more important. And finally, as explained before, the labor demand elasticity will also be affected by labor regulations through their impact on effective . However, this type of a labor demand function can be estimated only by controlling for demand conditions, which again we 10 As noted in section IV B below, our measure of employment includes permanent, temporary, and contract workers.
11 It must be noted that cost minimization and therefore the constantoutput labor demand can be written in terms of nominal factor prices or equivalently in terms of real factor prices (in units of the output), since product price is taken as given for this problem. The nominal and real wage labor demand elasticities coming out of cost minimization are therefore also the same.
12 Note that this formula is based on the assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRS) and perfect competition which ensure that the elasticity of output with respect to any factor equals its share in output and total factors rewards exhaust total output. If we want to make the formula independent of the market structure (and we retain CRS), then in place of labor share we just insert the output elasticity of labor. For a general Cobb-Douglas production function, the constant-output labor demand elasticity is just (RTS Ϫ ␤)/RTS where RTS represents returns to scale and ␤ is the elasticity of output with respect to labor. do by controlling for output (a proxy for demand conditions) instrumented by industry-specific exchange rates and state-level GDP. Thus, it will be not be possible to distinguish between the constant-output and unconstrained labor demand functions in our estimation.
IV. Estimation Issues and Data
A. Estimation Issues
Obtaining estimates of the labor demand function are central to determining how trade liberalization and labor regulations have affected workers. In what follows we describe our specifications of the labor demand function and discuss various estimation-related issues.
The labor demand function we estimate takes the following form:
where L denotes the employment of production workers in industry i, state s, and year t; f represents factor prices (wages, w; user cost of capital, r; and material prices, m in terms of the notation of section III above); 14 TP stands for trade policy and may vary by industry and over time; FLEX represents labor market flexibility across states; Q is output; Y represents year dummies; is is an industry-state effect; and ε ist is a white-noise error term. 15 The effects of trade liberalization and labor market flexibility on labor demand elasticity are captured by the coefficients of the interaction terms involving w and TP, and w and FLEX, respectively. 16 There are several issues pertaining to specification that are worth highlighting. First, our choice of estimating conditional labor demand functions is practical. Shocks to product demand are likely to move labor demand for an industry in the same direction. Estimating a labor demand equation without controlling for these shocks would then result in biased parameter estimates as the resulting shocks to labor demand trace out the labor supply curve. The inclusion of output in the conditional labor demand functions is likely to control for at least a part of the product demand shocks, thereby alleviating biases on this account.
Second, in order to interpret the estimated coefficients of equation (3) as parameters of the labor demand function, we need to assume that the supply of labor to each industrystate unit is perfectly elastic so that wages are exogenous. 17 This assumption may seem strong given that we do not have firm-level data. However, there are several mitigating factors in our application that serve to make this assumption a plausible one. In the first place, our unit of analysis is an industry-state combination where our data pertain to eighteen manufacturing industries disaggregated by fifteen of India's major states. This is a much higher level of disaggregation in comparison to studies that use either manufacturing-wide data or even economy-wide industrylevel data. In addition, employment in the formal manufacturing sector, from which our data come, is estimated to be less than 10% of total nonagricultural employment (Ghose, 1999) . This, combined with the pressures of rural-urban migration and the existence of considerable open and disguised unemployment in urban areas (Kundu & Gupta, 1996) , makes it likely that individual state-industry units will face a relatively elastic labor supply. 18 Third, we estimate our labor demand functions applied to five-year differences, and as robustness checks to sevenyear and nine-year differences, of the underlying data. By taking differences over a relatively long period, we in effect allow firms to have considerable time to adjust labor demand to a given shock. This does away with the need for including a lagged employment term as a regressor. Also, Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that long difference estimators (such as our five-, seven-, and nine-year difference estimators) tend to be less sensitive to measurement 14 We use nominal factor prices rather than real product factor prices (that is), factor prices deflated by product prices) in estimation. Since product prices are endogenous at the industry level, using nominal factor prices can alleviate endogeneity concerns. It may be noted, however, that results using real product factor prices were very similar to those based on nominal factor prices. 15 When trade policy takes the form of a trade liberalization dummy (that takes the value 0 until before the trade reform and 1 after it), such as our post-1991 dummy discussed later, it appears in the regression only in the form of interaction terms with the logs of the different factor prices and not as an intercept dummy. This is because the time intercept dummies (year dummies) already capture the effect of this variable and because our interest is mainly in whether and how labor demand elasticity responded to trade liberalization. 16 Thus if TP is measured in terms of tariff rates, then a positive estimate of ␦ wTP implies that tariff reductions are associated with an increase in labor demand elasticity. Similarly, if FLEX ϭ 1 if the labor market is flexible and 0 otherwise, then a negative value for ␦ wFLEX implies that labor market flexibility is associated with an increase in labor demand elasticity. FLEX appears only in interaction terms and not by itself in equation (3), since it turns out to vary only across states and not over time and since we have industry time fixed effects is . 17 An alternative would be to allow wages to be endogenous and use instruments for these. In the absence of any plausible instruments for wages in our data set, we tried using lagged wages as instruments but the results were quite poor. In particular, estimated wage elasticities were often positive. As a result we decided against instrumenting wages.
18 Indeed, calculations using individual-level data from the National Sample Survey data for 1993 suggest that the pool of informal-sector workers in manufacturing alone is large enough to keep labor supply to a state-industry unit in the formal sector fairly flat. In the Indian context, it is probably fair to assume that the bulk of self-employed workers in manufacturing would prefer to work as wage and salaried workers if they could (see, for example, Ghose, 1999, on this point). In urban areas alone, self-employed workers are 73% of the number of total wage and salaried workers in manufacturing. Since the latter include wage and salaried workers in the formal and informal sectors, the 73% figure is probably a lower bound on the ratio of self-employed workers in manufacturing to wage and salaried workers in formal manufacturing. Introducing the rural self-employed in manufacturing into the equation would likely drive the ratio of self-employed to wage and salaried workers in formal manufacturing to well over 1.
error than the fixed-effects estimator (which is itself less sensitive to measurement error than the first [one-year] difference estimator). 19 Finally, it is important to note that while endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables is always a concern in econometric analysis, the use of year dummies and time differencing alleviates such concerns. Consider, in particular, the potential endogeneity problem due to the reverse causation from labor to output in the constant-output labor demand function. Also, another reason why the output and error term might be correlated comes from the fact that unobserved shocks to technology affect both employment as well as output, which is a concern of omitted variables bias. Any such shock that is time specific will be captured by our year dummies, while shocks that are state specific or industry specific as well as those that are specific to any industry in any particular state will be captured implicitly through time differencing. This, in our opinion, would take care of the bulk of the problem associated with the correlation of the error term with output (and indeed with that of possibly any other right-hand-side variable).
Of course, it is still possible for there to be some remaining bias associated with some remaining correlation between the error term and the output variable. We therefore instrument the output variable with state GDP per capita and industry-specific exchange rates. Movements in state GDP per capita are likely to be exogenous to conditions specific to a particular industry, but could have important implications for conditions faced by individual industries. Similarly, movements in bilateral exchange rates are also likely to be driven by factors that are exogenous to conditions specific to a given industry. However, because trade partners can be very different across industries, changes in industryspecific competitiveness conditions induced by changes in bilateral exchange rates may serve as a proxy for the demand conditions faced by domestic industry. 20 These 2SLS regressions are still run in long differences. Another possible solution to the problem of the correlation between the error term and output is to assume constant returns to scale, which means the output coefficient in the labor demand function is unity and therefore the output term can be moved with negative sign to the left-hand side.
B. Data
The variables required for the estimation of the labor demand equations, equation (3), are measures of employment, wages, output, factor prices other than wages, and indicators for protection and labor market rigidity. Our source for production-related information and wages is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 21 from 1980 to 1997 which, among other things, reports for each industry-state combination values of gross output produced, intermediate inputs, wage bill, the book value of capital stocks, and the number of workers. 22 Since the ASI reports monetary values in current prices, appropriate price deflators are needed to convert the nominal values into real ones. We use industryspecific wholesale price index (WPI) series to deflate output to constant 1981 rupees. The WPI for machinery, transport equipment, and construction is used to deflate the book value of capital stock. Dividing the total wage bill by the number of workers is used to arrive at wages. Our materials price deflators are those constructed by Trivedi, Prakash, and Sinate (2000) . 23 The user cost of capital is constructed by multiplying the deflator for capital goods by the sum of national money market rates and rate of depreciation (assumed to be 10%).
As noted earlier, we use state GDP per capita and industryspecific exchange rates as instruments for output. While the data on state GDP per capita are easily available, industryspecific exchange rates need to be constructed. We compute three industry-specific real-exchange-rate measures following Goldberg (2003) . As Goldberg emphasizes, movements in bilateral exchange rates can have very different impact on competitiveness conditions across industries. This is because the importance of specific countries in exports and imports may vary considerably across countries. For example, the United State accounted for 22% of India's imports of transport equipment in 1995 but for less than 0.5% of India's imports of beverages. In contrast, Singapore accounts for 60% of India's total imported beverage products but only 3% of transport equipment. As a result, movements in the U.S. dollar-rupee exchange rate would probably have large implications for India's transport equipment industry but not its beverage industry, while the reverse would be true for movements in the Singapore dollar-rupee exchangerate. Since movements in bilateral exchange rates are driven by factors likely to be exogenous to conditions specific to a given industry, but could have important implications for 19 See also Westbrook and Tybout (1993) . 20 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting industryspecific exchange rates as an instrument.
21 ASI data cover establishments registered under the Factory Act and employing ten or more workers (with power and twenty or more workers without power). It provides information on eighteen manufacturing industries disaggregated by their location across India's states. 22 The term workers refers to production workers (permanent, contract, and temporary). The ASI also reports the number of "total employees," that is, production and nonproduction workers. Unfortunately, the ASI uses different definitions for reporting payments to "workers" (called "wages") and "total employees" (called "total emoluments"). Total emoluments include not only wages paid to production and nonproduction workers (not reported separately), but also the imputed value of benefits in kind provided to production and nonproduction workers (once again, not reported separately). This prevents us from computing a meaningful wage rate for nonproduction workers. Nevertheless, if we ignore this and compute a wage rate for nonproduction workers ([total emoluments Ϫ workers' wages]/[total employees Ϫ workers]) and include it in our labor demand regressions, the key results of our paper regarding the relationship between trade liberalization and labor demand elasticity go through. Additionally, the results are also unchanged if we estimate "total" labor demand equations (that is, for total employees with the wage rate now being computed as total emoluments divided by total employees).
23 Details of mapping from their product groups to the two-digit classification are provided in Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2003) . We thank Pushpa Trivedi for providing us with the data. conditions faced by individual industries, changes in industryspecific competitiveness conditions induced by changes in bilateral exchanges may serve as a proxy for the demand conditions faced by domestic industry. Denoting (a) bilateral real exchange rate between India and country c by rer t c ; (b) India's exports of industry j products to country c by X t jc ; and (c) India's imports of industry j products to country c by M t jc , we construct three real-exchange-rate measures as in Goldberg (2003) .
The first (second) is an industry-specific real-exchange-rate index where the weights on each partner country's bilateral real exchange rate are the shares of that partner country in India's exports (imports). The third can be seen as a simple average of the first two. To construct the three industryspecific real-exchange-rate measures, we need trade data, exchange rate data, and CPI indices for India and its trading partners for 1980-1997. We obtain the first from the World Trade Flowsdatabase (Feenstra, 2000b) , and the second and third from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Penn World Tables, version 6 .1 (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002) , respectively. We first compute the bilateral real exchange rate of each of India's trading partners (for which we have data on bilateral exchange rates and CPIs for each of our eighteen years). These are computed as the number of local currency units per Indian rupee multiplied by the ratio of India's CPI to that of the partner country's. Next, we compute the three industry-specific real exchange rates as in equations (4) to (6). As noted in Goldberg (2003) , an increase in the value of any of the three real exchange rates implies a real appreciation of the Indian rupee in "trade-weighted" terms.
As regards our trade policy variables, we capture the effects of trade liberalization in two ways. As described in section IIA, India embarked on a dramatic program of trade liberalization in 1991. Thus we use a liberalization dummy that takes the value 0 up to 1991 and 1 thereafter to capture the effects of a more liberal trading environment on labor markets. Since this dummy will not capture differences in protection across industries and the effects of year-to-year changes in protection, we use industry-year-specific tariff rates (shown in table 1) which we constructed for eighteen two-digit industries from those reported for 64 industrial product groups in Pandey (1999) for the years 1988-1997 (see Hasan, Mitra, & Ramaswamy, 2003 , for more details). 24 We also use information on nontariff barrier (NTB) coverage rates available in Pandey (1999) to construct a measure of NTB rates across our eighteen industries. 25 A drawback of the NTB data reported in Pandey (1999) is that it is provided for only three of our sample years, 1988, 1995, and 1997 . In order to be able to use all our data from 1988 onward, we use linear interpolation to fill in the years for which the data are missing. Since such a procedure may introduce imperfections in our measure of NTB rates, we consider our tariff rate as the more reliable measure for trade policy. Nevertheless, as will be made clear later on, our results using NTB rates are qualitatively the same.
We rely upon interstate variations in labor laws to account for labor market rigidity. More specifically we classify states in terms of whether they have flexible or rigid labor markets. A dummy variable created using this classification may then be interacted with wages (and other factor prices) to determine the impact of labor market flexibility on labor demand elasticities. Our procedure to classify states in terms of the flexibility of their labor markets is as follows. We start out by drawing upon Besley and Burgess (2002) , who first code each state-level amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) between 1958 and 1992 as a 1, Ϫ1, or 0 depending on whether the amendment in question is deemed to be proemployee, antiemployee, or neutral and then cumulate the coded scores over time (in net year terms) to give the general direction of change in labor regulation. 26 Since the analysis in this paper is based on data up to 1997, we checked to see if there has been any amendment activity between 1992 and 1997. A cross-check with Malik (1998) revealed no amendment activity; thus the score on cumulative amendments for 1992 applies all the way to 1997.
The scores on cumulative amendments between 1980 and 1997, the years of interest to this paper, do not vary much over time within states. 27 Given the restrictive nature of the 24 While tariff rates on inputs would be a conceptually superior measure to use in the context of the output-constrained labor demand equation, data availability forces us to use the overall industry tariff instead. This may not be a serious deficiency in our application given the degree of industrial aggregation within each of our eighteen industries. Consider the transportation equipment industry, for example. Since this includes the production of both automotive components and finished goods, the average tariff rate for this industry will in part be composed of inputs used in this industry. Thus the average tariff rate for this industry would capture the tariffs on both inputs and outputs for the industry. 25 The coverage rate measures the percent of products within a category whose imports are restricted or prohibited by the government.
26 See Besley and Burgess (2002) for details. (The Besley and Burgess coding is available at http://econ/lse/ac.uk/staff/rburgess/#wp.) 27 In the first place, eight of the fifteen major states saw effectively no amendment activity in these years. Second, in almost no state did amendments lead to a change in the overall stance of labor regulations as they existed in 1980. In other words, a state with antiemployee (proemployee) amendments on net in 1980 would have remained so all the way until 1997. Finally, if we focus on the 1988-1997 period-the period for which we have protection data that varies by both industry and time-there is virtually no amendment activity. The one exception is that of a proemployee amendment made in a state that already started out as having a net proemployee orientation as of 1980. central (federal) IDA, a natural way to classify states would therefore be to treat states with antiemployee amendments (in net cumulative year terms) to the IDA as those with flexible labor markets. 28 The first column of table 2 lists the various states based on such a classification. The results appear generally reasonable. However, the classification of three states is puzzling: Maharashtra and Gujarat, which are classified as having inflexible labor markets, and Kerala, which is classified as having a flexible labor market. Based on the industrial record of these three states, the left-leaning nature of governments in Kerala, and the results of a detailed survey of manufacturing firms' managers on regulatory barriers across ten states (World Bank, 2003) , a case can be made for treating Maharashtra and Gujarat as having flexible labor markets and Kerala as having an inflexible labor market (see Hasan, Mitra, & Ramaswamy, 2003 , for more details). For example, a question on firms' perceptions about "overmanning"-that is, how the optimal level of employment would differ from current employment given the current level of output-indicated that while overmanning was present in all states, it was lowest on average in Maharashtra and Gujarat. 29 Thus, we consider a modified partition in which Maharashtra and Gujarat are treated as states with flexible labor markets while Kerala is treated as one with inflexible labor markets. 30 The remaining columns of table 2 provide a classification of states by the World Bank (2003) and our modified classification.
V. Empirical Analysis
A. Trade Liberalization, Labor Regulations, and Labor Demand Elasticities
As described in section III, a more liberal trade policy may be expected to raise the labor demand elasticity by increasing substitution possibilities among factor inputs and making product demand more elastic. More liberal regulation of labor markets can have similar effects. Thus less stringent job security laws may allow labor to be more easily substituted for other factors. We now examine the evidence for these possibilities. Table 3 presents the relevant parameters of our labor demand equation estimated from OLS applied to data differenced by five years. 31 Considering differences over long periods of time should allow for full adjustments to be made in response to changes in factor prices and the level of product demand. Also, such differencing, as mentioned in section IVA, can reduce measurement error bias.
The labor demand elasticity is found to increase in absolute value in the post-1991 period (column 1) and with 28 An alternative measure of labor market flexibility/rigidity would have been to use the cumulative scores on amendments. This is the approach of Besley and Burgess (2002) . We do not use this approach given the limited variability in cumulative amendments over the period of interest to this paper. Moreover, insofar as its interaction with factor price terms is concerned, it is not clear to what extent a cardinal measure such as the number of cumulative amendments captures the actual difference in labor market rigidity across states.
29 A supplement to the original World Bank survey carried out in two "good investment climate states" and one "poor investment climate state" (a category in which Kerala is included) was aimed at determining the reasons behind overmanning. The results indicated that overmanning was partially the result of labor hoarding in anticipation of higher growth in the future in the good investment climate states but hardly so in the poor investment climate state. In fact, labor regulations were noted as a major reason for overmanning in the latter. This lends indirect support to the notion that given Maharashtra and Gujarat's ranking as "best investment climate" states, labor regulations have in effect been less binding on firms than the amendments to the IDA may suggest. 30 It may, however, be noted that results obtained by retaining the Besley-and-Burgess-based classification of these three states are very similar. 31 Since our difference estimator exploits variation in the "within" dimension, we cannot include an own term for labor market flexibility since this only varies by state. We also cannot include own terms for the post-1991 dummy in estimating our labor demand equations given that we use year dummies. Similarly, since the user cost of capital varies only by year, it is not possible to include it and its interaction with the post-1991 dummy. 
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reductions in tariff rates (columns 2 and 3) and NTBs (column 4). 32 This is seen from the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction between the natural logarithm of the wage rate and the postreform dummy in column 1 and the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between the log of wage and protection in the other columns. While in column 2 tariffs are in levels, they are in logs in column 3. The coefficient of the interaction between log wage and labor market flexibility is negative in all the columns but is significant only in column 1. This is some, albeit weak, evidence that the elasticity of labor demand also increases in magnitude with the flexibility of labor markets. Based on table 3 coefficients, using the post-1991 dummy as the trade policy variable, the labor demand elasticity went up in absolute value from 0.057 in 1988 to 0.193 in 1997 in 32 It may also be noted that we estimated labor demand equations by including both tariff rates as well as NTBs simultaneously. Both interaction terms involving log wages yielded statistically insignificant estimates. This is probably a result of the high degree of correlation between tariff rates and NTBs (0.60). When we combined both measures of protection into one using principal-components methods, all the key results of the paper were obtained. 33 Using the log of tariffs, the elasticity went up from 0.306 to 0.345 in the rigid states, while it went up from 0.428 to 0.467 in the flexible states. We also get qualitatively similar results with the NTBs and the log of NTBs as the trade policy variable.
From column 1, we also see that the positive cross price elasticity with respect to materials price had gone up after the reforms and was higher in states with greater labor market flexibility. This shows an increase in substitutability between labor and raw materials following the 1991 trade reform. This substitutability was also higher on the whole in states with more flexible labor institutions. Table 4 shows us similar results when we allow elasticities to vary across industries (columns 1, 4, and 7), and when we divide our sample into flexible and rigid labor market states (remaining columns). 34 The support for the hypothesis that labor demand elasticities go up with trade openness is much more strongly supported for the more flexible states than for the states with rigid labor institutions. This is evident from comparing the coefficient on the interaction between log wage and tariff rates (log tariff rates) across columns 5 and 6 (columns 8 and 9). 33 The formula used to calculate these economic changes is as follows: If our labor demand equation is given as lnL it ϭ ␤ ln w it ϩ ␥(ln w it )(trade policy it ) ϩ other terms, then the five-year differenced model to be estimated can be written as ln L it Ϫ ln L itϪ5 ϭ ␤ (ln w it Ϫ ln w itϪ5 ) ϩ ␥[(ln w it )(trade policy it ) Ϫ (ln w itϪ5 )(trade policy itϪ5 )] ϩ other terms. The elasticity in year t in industry i is just ␤ ϩ ␥trade policy it . In case we are also interacting log of wage with FLEX as well, this formula is the elasticity in year t in industry i for FLEX ϭ 0, so that adding the coefficient of this additional interaction term between log of wage and FLEX will give us the elasticity in the case of a flexible state. 34 The prereform individual industry labor demand elasticities (the coefficients of the log wage term), estimated in the regression using the postreform dummy (column 1 of table 4), range between 0.59 and Ϫ0.73, with a mean of Ϫ0.10. When we use tariff as a measure of protection in the regression (column 4), the coefficients of the log wage term (in this case, the elasticities at zero tariff) vary from 0.81 to Ϫ1.55, with a mean of Ϫ0.28. Results are qualitatively similar when we use the log of tariff. Notes. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) significant at 1% level. Year dummies (and interaction of industry dummies and factor prices in columns 1, 4, and 7) included in estimation but not reported. (A) Estimate is zero to the third decimal place.
In all of the above regressions, we control for output. Output can be considered to be a proxy for the level of output demand. However, output itself is endogenous to employment, which makes the output correlated with the error term. Additionally, unobserved technology shocks can magnify this correlation. The correlation between the output level and the error term may bias our estimates of labor demand elasticities and the change in it postreform. We therefore instrument the output variable with state GDP and industry-specific exchange rates. 35 These 2SLS regressions are still run in five-year differences. These results are shown in table 5 and are no different qualitatively from our OLS results. 36
B. Robustness Checks
Another possible solution to the problem of the correlation between output and the error term is to assume constant returns to scale, which means the output coefficient in the labor demand function is unity and therefore the output term can be moved with negative sign to the left-hand side. This is not unreasonable, as in many cases in table 5 we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. 37 Again, in table 6, we see that our results with the estimation of labor demand for a CRS production function are qualitatively no different. A benefit, however, of performing this exercise is that the coefficient on the log wage term has been precisely estimated in all cases considered. While the elasticity for the whole sample was roughly 0.38 before the reform, it rose to 0.52 after the reform (column 1). The estimates are quite similar for the subsample with 35 The results reported in table 5 are based on import-weighted industryspecific real exchange rates (equation [5] above). Results based on trade-weighted industry-specific real exchange rates (equation [6] above) yielded very similar results. 36 We also ran a 2SLS regression with the protection variable as the principal-components aggregation of tariffs and NTBs. The results are qualitatively no different. 37 A test of the hypothesis that the coefficient on log output equals 1 yielded a p-value ranging from 0.11 to 0.32 for the specifications reported in columns 5 through 9 of table 5. rigid labor institutions, but for the subsample of flexible states the elasticity increased from a prereform value of 0.64 to 0.8 after the reforms (column 3).
Another robustness check we perform is to use sevenyear and nine-year differences instead of five-year differences. As can be seen from table 7, which is based on 2SLS, the results are no different from ones we have seen so far. The elasticity of labor demand with respect to wage increases in magnitude with trade openness (that is, the elasticity decreases with respect to protection) in the flexible labor market sample but not in the rigid sample. For the flexible sample, a decline in tariff rates from 150% to 40% is associated with an increase in the elasticity from 0.24 to 0.46 for the specification using tariffs as a trade policy variable and based on seven-year differences (column 2), and an increase from 0.64 to 0.86 if nine-year differences are used instead (column 6). Results are very similar if log tariffs are used as a measure of trade policy.
A final robustness check we carry out is to estimate standard dynamic labor demand functions, which have an additional lagged term ln L itϪ1 . Estimation is carried out using the one-step GMM-IV estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) applied to first-differenced data. The results are presented in table 8. 38 As required for instrument validity of this GMM-IV estimator, the transformed error term displays negative first-order serial correlation and no secondorder serial correlation in every model estimated (see the last two rows of table 8). While the coefficient of the lagged employment term in these regressions is unrealistically small, our main results regarding labor demand elasticity go through even in these regressions. As the estimates reported in table 8 reveal, labor demand elasticity increases with trade liberalization, or decreases with protection (columns 1, 3, and 7), and this effect is more pronounced in states with more flexible labor institutions (columns 5 and 9). 38 The GMM-IV estimator involves (a) carrying out a first difference transformation of equation (3) (but including a lag dependent term) to get rid of the correlation between is and lnL itϪ1 (and other right-hand-side variables); and (b) using an instrument for the lagged, differenced employment term, lnL itϪ1 Ϫ lnL itϪ2 since it is correlated with the transformed error term, ε ist Ϫ ε istϪ1 . As long as the ε ist are not serially correlated, a natural choice for an instrument is lnL itϪ2 . Additional instruments can be obtained by utilizing the orthogonality conditions existing between the further lags of employment and ε ist . 
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C. The Share of Labor in Output and Value Added
As argued by Rodrik (1997) , one of the implications of this rise in labor demand elasticity is a reduction in the bargaining power of labor relative to capital. To check for this we regress labor's share in output and in value added on the postreform dummy and on tariff rates. 39, 40 From table 9, we clearly see that the share of labor fell after 1991 (columns 1 and 4). Moreover, the share of labor has fallen faster in industries that saw larger reductions in tariff rates (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6).
A decline in the share of labor has implications for the output-constrained labor demand elasticity, which as we have seen earlier is given by ͯ
For a given elasticity of substitution , this labor demand elasticity goes up when the share of labor falls. Our results regarding the share of labor therefore suggest that unless there was an offsetting or higher reduction in , the outputconstrained labor demand elasticity should have gone up. In fact, we estimate to have gone up after the reforms and to be increasing in protection. 41
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have rigorously looked at how major trade reforms initiated in India in 1991 affected labor demand elasticities in the manufacturing sector. Our data are disaggregated by state and industry and are for the period 1980-1997. Given that we have variation across industries and over time in protection levels and variation across states in labor market institutions, we believe ours is the first paper that is able to decompose the effect of protection and labor regulations on these elasticities and at the same time look at the interaction between the two.
Our results indicate that labor demand elasticities increase with reductions in protection. Protection thus appears to have the effects that theory would predict. We also find that the response of labor demand elasticities to protection is conditioned by the nature of labor institutions: states with more flexible labor markets see larger increases in labor demand elasticities in response to reductions in protection. This is consistent with the point recently made, in the context of growth, by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) -that the effect of economic policies (such as trade 39 Estimation is carried out in levels and employing industry-state fixed effects. 40 The results are qualitatively identical if NTB coverage rates are used in place of tariff rates. 41 The simplest approach to estimating the elasticity of substitution between labor and other inputs is to assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. We can estimate this elasticity of substitution by estimating a system of two equations (seemingly unrelated regressions, SUR), one in which ln(K/L) is a linear function of ln(w/r) and its interaction with protection, and another in which ln(M/L) is a linear function of ln(w/material price) and its interaction with protection. The coefficients in the two equations are restricted to be the same in this CES case. policy) depends in important ways on the institutional context.
These findings have important implications for public policy and highlight some challenges for policymaking. First, the increases in labor demand elasticities we estimate imply stronger transmission of productivity and output volatility into the labor market.
Second, although tighter labor regulations-through restrictions on layoffs, for example-can dampen this volatility, it is hard to believe that more widespread use of such Notes. Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) significant at 1% level. ( #,## ) Test statistics for first-and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Year dummies (and interaction of industry dummies and factor prices in columns 3 and 7) included in estimation but not reported. (A) Estimate is zero to the third decimal place. 
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regulations is the desirable policy response. Particularly in the context of India's growing integration with the international economy, allowing Indian firms to be exposed to import competition but constraining their ability to adjust their inputs in response is likely to put domestic firms at a serious disadvantage in terms of their ability to compete. 42 Third, we also uncover another negative effect of trade liberalization on the share of labor in total output. This reduction in labor share may be the result of a loss in its bargaining power, again brought about by an increase in labor demand elasticties as explained in Rodrik (1997) .
Finally, the negative consequences of trade on worker welfare uncovered in this paper need to be assessed against its positive effects. Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Hasan (2002) , based on analysis of distinct firm-level panel data sets from India, find evidence that trade can contribute to productivity growth. 43 In fact, a more elastic labor demand will translate this growth into higher growth in wages and employment. Krishna and Mitra also find a massive reduction in markups across all sectors, thereby implying (a) a significant destruction of monopolies (and the associated deadweight losses), (b) the transformation of large amounts of producer surpluses into consumer surpluses, and (c) a reduction in the wedge between real wages and the marginal product of labor. Also, the greater ease of substitution between factor inputs that we observe after the reforms probably leads to a more efficient allocation of resources.
In view of the opposing effects that trade can have on workers, what does seem clear is that developing effective institutions that protect the welfare of workers adversely affected by trade without impinging on the ability of firms to adjust to changing conditions is a key challenge for public policy. 42 Indeed, this is one of the arguments used by reform-minded policymakers dissatisfied with Indian labor regulations. See in particular the recent report on employment-related issues commissioned by the Planning Commission, Government of India (2001) . 43 Krishna and Mitra (1998) find that productivity growth increased after trade reforms in many of the manufacturing industries they examine, while Hasan (2002) finds that imported technology can be an important source of productivity growth for manufacturing-sector firms.
